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THE CRISIS lN UN PEACEKEEPING 
Peacekeeping operations under United Nations auspices have achieved 
notable results in recent years, in countries as far apart as Namibia, Cam-
bodia, EI Salvador and Bosnia. At the same time, UN peaeekeeping is in 
erisis, beeause of a host of faetors: tried and tested principies and praetiees 
of UN peaeekeeping have had to be modified or abandoned; there have 
been repeated diffieuIties in the eontrol and management of UN operalions; 
the distinetion between peaeekeeping and enforeement has become blurred; 
states have imposed numerous conditions on their participation in opera-
tions; lhe many proposals to place forces at lhe general disposal of the UN have 
failed; peaeekeeping finanee remaios a nightmare; some operations, as in 
Angola, have been followed by a resumption of war; the range of eonfliets 
around the world far exeeeds the Un's eapacity to address them; and there 
have been accusations of bias in the ehoiee of whieh eonflicts to address, 
and the manner of doing soo There has been a bewildering variety of dia-
gnoses, and of preseriptions for improvement. 
I. CAN UN PEACEKEEPING BE SEEN AS PART DF A CDLLECTIVE 
SECURITY SYSTEM? 
Peaeekeeping operations are only one part of the response of the inter-
nalionaI eommunity to situalions of intemational and internal eonfliet. By 
eommon eonsent, even if there is some overIap in praetiee, they are distinet 
from many other types of aetion under UN auspiees, incIuding enforee-
ment aetions. 
ln the post-Cold War era, lhe problems of peaeekeeping have often 
been discussed in a broader context of seeing an apportunity to establish 
a new system of peaee and seeurity based on the UN. ln 1993 Brian Urquhart 
asked the key questian: «Are we trying to establish a eomprehensive system 
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of international peace and security based on the resources and the politicai 
will of the membership of the United Nations (')? ln my submission Ihere 
are ground. for doubt as to whelher the aim should be set quite so high. 
Is such a system actually attainable, and what it would actually look 
like? 
Four principal considerations make me pessimistic about the chances 
of establishing a suhstantiaIly new system of peace and security, of which 
peacekeeping would he one part: 
a. The idea of a fundamentally new security system involves, in addition 
to peacekeeping, heavy reliance on «collective security)>: this term 
refers to a system in which an attack on one member of the inter-
national community is treated as an attack on ali, and leads to a 
strong and decisive response by the community. The idea of collec-
tive security is a very old one, which has perennially run into 
difficulties; and much present advocacy of it does not take ioto 
account the past history and problems of lhe idea ('). 
b. On the more specific topic of peacekeeping - the central concern 
of this paper - nothiog the pas! record or present performance of 
UN peacekeeping operations entitIes us to see these activities as a 
viable response to more than a Iimited, albeit somewhat expanding, 
range of situations. 
c. The genius of the UN system, and a key to its modest but still remar-
kable success in the past half century, is its relatively successful com-
bination of, on lhe one hand, acceptance of sovereign states which 
retain their military power and their right to individual and collec-
tive self-defence; and, on the other hand, establishment of the rudi-
ments of a structure for co-operative decision-making and multila-
teral military action in a UN framework in at least a substantial 
range of situations. 
(I) Brian Urquhart, «The Future af Peace-keeping», paper at lhe June 1993 Oslo Sympo-
sium 00 Collective Responses to Common Threats, p. 3. 
e) The difficulties of the idea of collective security are outlined in the introductory 
chapter in Adam Robcrts and Benedict Kingsbury (cds.), United Nations, Divided World: 
The UN's Roles in International Relatio1Js, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 1993. pp. 29-31. 
For a succinct survey and assessmcnt of the history af UN peacekeeping, sec Sally Mor-
phet's chapter in the sarne book, pp. 183·239. 
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This dual aspecl of the UN syslem can be foud in lhe Charler ilself. 
Many of its provisions contain much more generous a1lowance for 
lhe continued rale of slales, and even conlinued slale conlrol of 
military power, Ihan did the Leargue of Nalions Covenant. Particu-
lar Charler provisions illuslrating this poinl include ArticIe 51, with 
its famous passage on «individual 01' colleclive self-defence»; Ar-
ticle 2 (7) on domeslic jurisdictions; and the exlreme caution of the 
references lo disal1Uament in Arlicle II (I), 26, and 47 (I). 
d. The Cold War was not lhe only factor which prevented the UN 
system fram managing security issues on the largely cooperalive 
basis which might seem to have been envisaged in the Charler. As 
is nOw rapidly becoming apparent, Ihere are other and more endu-
ring faclors in international polilics which make difficult 01' impos-
sible lhe realization of the dream of ali major security problems 
being handled in a UN framework. ln parlicular, states seem lo guard 
their power oveI' Iheir own armed focres jcalously. II is significanl 
that in almost half a century since the UN was founded, nol one 
slate has conc1udcd an agreement making forces available lO the 
UN in the manner provided for in Article 43 of the UN Charte!'. 
We have lo draw serious conc1usions from Ihis about the viability 
af supra-nalional visions of a UN security syslem. 
These four reasons for pessimism may we11 be ignored in this period 
in which Ihere are high expectations of whal the UN can achive. Yet igno-
ring these factors, and holding out excessively high hopes for lhe UN, is 
liable to lead lo disappointment and recrimination. Indeed, if the UN is 
seen as in some way supplanting existing functions of states, Ihere is a 
strong likelihood Ihat the sovereign stale, which is far from dead, wiII 
reassert its existence and vitality aI lhe expence of lhe UN, with serious 
consequences for lhe latter. 
Despite the grounds for pessimism, Ihere are in facl elements of a 
system of inlemational security. This system encompasses a wide range of 
measures of arms limitation, including in the field of nuclear nonprolifera-
lion. There is also a slrong emphasis on force only being used for defensive 
purposes. There are also many elemenls which are diffcrc;lI from what 
was laid down in the UN Charter: the paltern of certain uses of force by 
coalilions being authorized by lhe UN Security Council- as in Korea in 1950, 
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over Kuwait in 1990-91, and in Somalia in 1992-93; the emergence of an 
impressive praetice of mediation and good offiees within a UN framework; 
ando of course, UN peacekeeping_ 
2_ ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF UN PEACEKEEPlNG UP TO 1987 
Peacekeeping operations were not foreseen in the UN Charter, and 
emerged on an ad hoc basis in response to urgent problems_ 
ln the period up to the end of 1987, there were thirteen UN peacekeeping 
operations, ali but one of whieh were concemed with confliets that had 
arisen following European descolonization: many other problems, including 
more directly East-West conflicts, were addressed through other mechanisms, 
mainly outside a UN frameworl. 
The traditional tasks of UN peaeekeeping operations, as they evolved 
from the 1950s to the 1970s, ineluded monitoring and enforeement of cease-
-fires; observation of frontier Iines; and interposition between beIligerents. 
These tasks were generally carried out on the basis of three key principies: 
lhe consent of the parties, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and nan-use 
of force in most eircumstanees. These three principies were seen as being 
interlinked, and as being fundamental to the effeetiveness of peacekeeping 
operations. 
Non-use of force, though not an absolute principie, was central to 
the practice of UN peace keeping for many years. As Marrack Goulding 
has said: 
More than ha\f the organization's peacekeeping operations before 
1988 had consisted only of unarmed military observers. But when 
operations were armed, it had become an established principie 
that they should use force only to the miniraum extent necessary 
and that normally fire should be apened only in self-defence. 
On the basis of the principies established during the first four decades. 
he went on to define UN peacekeeping as foIlows: 
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between them, under United Nations eommand and control, at 
the expense collectively of the member states , and with military 
and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, 
acting impartially between the parties and using force to the mini-
mum extent necessary ('). 
ln the first decades of UN peacekeeping operations, the requiremenl 
of impartiality and disinterestedness was among the factors leading to the 
general practice of not using certain countries' troops. ln particular, the 
UN for the most part avoided use of contingents from the permanent five 
(especially China and the two superpowers); and it also avoided relying 
on forces from neighbouring powers. The merits of these practices were 
obvious: local conflicts were insulated from Cold War rivalry and regional 
hegemony. The weaknesses of the practice were equally ohvious: UN forces 
sometimes lacked the authority and strength that a great power presence 
could have provided; or they lacked the local knowledge, interest, and 
staying power that forces from a neighbouring power might have had. 
There was no shortage of problems in the first thirteen UN peacekeeping 
operations. The weakness of depending on the consent of the host state 
was cruelly exposed by the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEFI) from Egypt in 1967, and the subsequent outbreak of war 
between Israel and a number of Arab states inc1uding Egypt. Sometimes 
in practice the performance of the original mandate led on to additiona 1 
tasks which did not sit easily with the three principIes outlined above. ln 
the Congo in 1960-64 the tasks of the UN force carne to inc1ude assisting 
in the maintenance of govemment and public order, and the use of military 
force to achieve these ends against a variety of challenges: this ear1y case of 
peacekeeping turning into enforcement succeeded, but at a huge price. ln 
Cyprus in 1974, and in Lebanon in 1982, the presence of UN peacekeeping 
forces could not prevent breakdowns of order including major foreign invasi-
ons and seizures of territory. 
The achievements of UN peacekeeping, although modest, were real: 
they included the effective freezing of certain conflicts; some reduction 01' 
the risk, or extent, of competitive interventions by neighbouring or major 
(3) Goulding, «The Evolution af Peacekeeping», p. 455. 
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pawers; and isolation of sarne local conflicts fram the East-Wcst strllggle, 
so that they did not exacerbate the Iatler. ln short, some wars were preveu-
ted from spreading, and some missions effectively accomplished. While the 
development of UN peacekeeping before lhe end of the Cold War was 
impressive, it wOllld be wrong to depict it as a goIden era. 
3. HOW HAS THE CHARACTER OF UN PEACEKEEPING CHANGED? 
ln the past six years there has been a dramatic expansion of lhe number 
of UN peacekeeping and observer forces. The often repeated, constantly 
changing, and ever more impressive litany of statistics shows just how 
remarkable the expansion has been. From 1948 to 1978, thirteen peace-
keeping and observer forces were set up. Then for ten years no new ones 
wcre established. Since early 1988 a further twenty have been created ('). 
Now peacekeeping is in a new era, tackling a vast array of new pro-
blems. However, many of the new commitments involve peacekeeping 
forces in performing a bewildering variety of tasks with an unusually com-
plex set of mandates. ln both Somalia and Yugoslavia, as discussed Iater, 
these mandates involved authorization of force by or On behalf or peaee-
keeping forces: a step towards a type of aetion - namely enforeement - that 
has traditionally been viewed as distinct from peaeekeeping. 
Reasons for lhe Expansion of Peacekeeping Activities 
A main reason for this cxpansion in the num bel' of peacekeeping and 
observer missions has been, simply, the increascd capacity of the Secllrity 
Council to reach agreement on action in particular crises once it was no longer 
hamstlUng by lhe previously heavy use of the veto by four of the Permanent 
Five members. Tbe last-ever Soviet veto was on 29 FeblUary 1984, on a 
resolution proposing an extension in the Beirut area of what was at that 
time the last UN peacekeeping force to have been created (UNIFIL in 
Lebanon). Then from J une 1990 to 11 May 1993 Ihere was not a single 
(~) For a list or the 33 UN Peacekeeping and Observer Forces established to date. 
~.::ú the Appendix to this paper. 
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use of the veto, though of course its very existence still powerfully influen-
ced decisions. On 11 May 1993 Russia broke the record threc·year period 
of non-use when it vetoed a resolution on the financing of the long - esta· 
blished peacekeeping force in Cyprus. It is signifieant that it was on a 
peaeekeeping issue that use of the veto resumed: Russia had reason to resent 
being asked to bear the financial burden of UN peacekeeping in the apparen-
tly stable island of Cyprus, at a time when the UN was hardly making a 
notable contribution to the much more urgent crises faced by Russia both 
intemally and on its borders. Despite this use of the veto by Russia in 1993, 
wbich may be a harbinger of things to come, the new-found capacity of 
the Security Council to reaeh agreement has more ar less survived, and 
constitutes a key par! of the explanation of the inerease in the number of 
peaeekeeping operations ('). 
A further factor leading to the expansion of peacekeeping has been a 
widespread mood of optimism that the UN can have a much more central 
role in international security matters, and that peacekeeping can take on 
a very wide range of urgent problems. National governments as well as 
the UN itself shared this mood to a surprising degree. The heads of governo 
ment at the Security Council summit at the end of Tanuary 1992, and 
Secretary-General Boutros·Ghali in bis Ali Agenda for Peace published in 
Tune 1992, reflected and for a period reinforced this optimism ('). 
Finally, the end of the Cold War, and in particular the circumstanccs 
in a number af countries undergoing severe conflicts, created an increased 
need for international peacekeeping forces. ln particular: (1) The pcace 
agreements (ali with an East-West dimension) ending foreign interventions 
and/or conflicts - in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central America, and 
Cambodia - created a demand for impartial international forces to assist 
in implementing their provisions on such matters as monitoring cease·fires, 
(5) Statistics 00 the use of the veto to date may be found in Adam Roberts and 
Benedict Kinsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided World, 2nd edn., pp. 10-11. China has 
been far the most abstemious power, having anly used the veto three times: ooce in 1955 
(when it was represented at the UN by the regime in Taiwan), and twice in 1972. 
(6) Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Prcventive Dip[omacy, Peacemaking Gnd 
Pcace-keeping, Unitcd Nations, New York, 1992. For a chalIcnging article af the sarne 
period, ealling for the major powers to 8ive «unconditional subordination of an oppropriate 
element of their effectivc military assets to an integrated UN command system». see John 
Mackinlay and Tarat Chopra, Second Generation Multínational Operations, The Washington 
Quarterlr. Summcr 1992. pp, 113-31. 
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troop withdrawals, and elections. (2) The decline and coUapse of ComnlU-
nist systems resulted, in some cases, in new conflicts: and some ai these 
(especially in former Yugoslavia) led to strong caUs for action under UN 
auspices. (3) FoUowing the end of the Cold War, the major powers were 
less likely than before to see a conflict in a distant country in geostrategic 
terms as part of a chaIlenge to them from their major global adversary 
whlch required them to make an essentiaUy unilateral military riposte: they 
were therefore more willing to see a response emerge from within a UN 
framework. 
New Types of Task for UN Peacekeeping 
Since the late 1980s UN peacekeeping operations have involved a 
remarkably wide variety of activities. 
Some tasks assigned to peacekeeping operations since 1988 have been 
partly or whoIly new for them: 
- monitoring and even running elections (as in Namibia, EI Salvador, 
Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique). 
- protecting inbabitants of a region, whether the majority ar minorities 
from the tbreat or use of force - including by lhe govemment of 
the region and/or country (part of the function in the three United 
Nations Protected Areas, or UNPAs, in Croatia). 
- assuring delivery of humanitarian relief, and the performance of a 
wide range of other humanitarian tasks, during conflicts (especiaUy 
in former Yugoslavia and Somalia). 
- assisting in the reconstruction of certain governmental or poliee 
functions after civil war (incIuding in El Salvador and Cambodia). 
There should be no objection in principie to developing and expan-
ding the tasks of peacekeeping. New circumstances have required new forms 
of action, and have presented some opportunities that had to be seized. 
lndeed, some of the developments since the late 1980s are extremely pro-
mising. Election-monitoring under UN auspices has had many successes. 
Sometimes, as in Nicaragua and Haiti, UN election verification was con-
ducted on its own, not as part of a peacekeeping missiono However, several 
agreements in the late 1980s and earIy 1990s seeking to end internal con-
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flicts, including in their intemational aspects, provided both for elections 
as an aceptable means of determining who was to rule, and also for a peace-
keeping force whose tasks included monitoring ar even helping organize 
the elections. Such outside assistance failed to prevent a renewed outbreak 
of civil war in Angola in 1992 (just as verification had been unable to pre-
vent a coup in Haiti in September 1991). However, the picture elsewhere 
looks more hopeful. This function is particularly significant, for two reasons. 
First, it associates the UN with the idea of multi-party democracy. Second, 
it enables peacekeeping forces to be involved in something more than the 
mere freezing of conflicts: in some countries (though not in ali), UN for-
ces can achieve more by assisting in ballots than by interposing themselves 
between belligerents. 
However, assisting democracy, like other aspects of UN peacekeeping, 
depends powerfully on local cooperation. Where this is denied ar with-
drawn, problems begin. The nature of post-conflict societies can make the 
realization of democracy a distant goal. A United Nations which concems 
itself with the type of govemment in member states may find itself invol-
ved in a wide range of complex and dangerous disputes. Sometimes, as 
in the débâcle over Haiti in 1993, the UN may be powerless, apar! fram 
use of sanctions, in face of even a small and weakly armed sovereign state. 
Many other aspects of the expanded character of UN peacekeeping 
have been problematical. «HlIlnanitarian reliei» is a case in point. Too 
often, the natural emphasis on such relief has been accompanied by a failure 
to think through the broader questions raised by an involvement. It may be 
necessary, but it is never enough, to say that the UN's role in a erisis is 
essentiaIly humanitarian. There is also a need for tough analysis of the 
problems and crises which ereated the need for aid, and of policies for tackling 
them. 
The central difficulty in the expansion of tasks of UN peaeekeeping 
has been in the blurring of the lines between peacekeeping and coercive 
aetion. This is intimately linked to a tendeney to down-grade the require-
ment of eonsent of the parties as a pre-eondition for se!ting up and main-
taining a peacekeeping operation. There is a mueh more interventionist 
elemenl in peaeekeeping today, and this is at the heart of the crisis. 
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COllsellt as a Basis for Peacekeepillg 
The down-grading of the consent of the parties as a requirement for 
UN action occurred in three important crises in 1991-93, and was accom-
panied by a change io doctrine regarding peacekeeping operations. 
The establishment of the Kurd-inhabited «safe havens» areas in nor-
thern Iraq in April 1991 was achieved, not by any formal UN peacekeeping 
force, but by US, British and French forces. These were subsequentIy repla-
ced by a smaIl group of UN guards, who were eotirely distinct fram peace-
keepiog forces. This experieoce did, however, mark a decisive crossing of 
an important line about the requirements for action under UN auspices. 
There was no Iraqi consent to the initial incursion of coalition forces; 
and although there were subsequentIy Iraqui-UN agreemenls under which 
lhe UN guards were seul to northern Iraq, c1early Iraq's consenl was in 
some measure the outcome of the earlier forcible incursion ('). This action 
under UN auspices, because it both saved large numbers of Iives and showed 
some degree of ability to act againsl the wishes of a sovereign slate, stron-
gJy influeoced subsequent UN aclion in other crises. 
Less Ihan a year later, in lhe exceptionally difficult circumstances of 
lhe wars in former Yugoslavia, a second case arose in which the issue of 
consenl was in praclice more complex and nuanced than in the theory: 
and Ihis lime, a UN peacekeeping force was involved. The original Security 
Counci! resolution of February 1992 aulhorizing lhe United Nations Pro-
tection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia, whi!e conlaining evidence 
af elemenls of consent, also specified lhat the Counci! was acting under 
its responsibi!ity «for the mainlenance of inlernational peace and securi-
ty» - a coded reference to Chapter VII of lhe Charler; and, by referring 
to Artic1e 25 of the Charler, reminded stales of Iheir formal obligalion lo 
accept alld carry out the decisiolls of the Security Coullci!. Further, Ihis 
resolution set UNPROFOR up for a definite term which was a matter for 
decisioll by the Security Council ('). Ali of this implied, at the very least, 
o The tcxts of the agreemcnts bctwccn the UN and Iraq are in UN doe. S/22663 
uI 3i May 1991. See also Lawrence Frcedman and David Baren, .Safe Havens» for Kurds 
in Post-War Iraq, in Nigel Rodley (cd.), To Loose the Bands of Wickcdness: lntcrnational 
Intcrvention ;11 Defense of Humall Righls, Brassey's, London. 1992. pp. 43·92. 
e) Sccurity Council Resolutian 743 af 21 Feb. 1992, preamble and para. 3. 
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that allhough the operation began with a degree of consent of the parties, 
it might continue even wilhout that consen!. Subsequent resolutions have 
continued along similar lines. 
Within a few months of the establishment of UNPROFOR, the down-
grading of consent as an absolute requirement for peacekeeping was also 
apparent in Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace, published in June 1992. 
This famously defined peacekeeping as follows: 
Peace-keeping is lhe deployment of a United Nations presence in 
the field, hilherto wilh lhe consent of all lhe parties concerned, 
nonnally involving United Nations military and/or police person-
nel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique 
Ihat expands lhe possibilities for bolh lhe prevention of conflict 
and the making of peace ('). 
The «hitherto» in that definition became the subject of much comment 
from individuais and states. There were !wo main grounds for concern. 
First, that tried and tested principies of UN peacekeeping were being chan-
ged, and perhaps fatally weakened, wilhout full discussion of ali lhe impli-
cations; and second, many individuais and states (mainly small and/or 
developing ones) feared a new interventionism. 
ln Somali a , especialIy from December 1992 onwards, the criterion 
of consent has been further down-graded. There was no functioning govern-
ment there to give 01' refuse consent. AIso, as in Yugoslavia, the number of 
parties to the conflict and lhe disputes about their status made consent 
of ali the parties hard to abtain and impossible to maintain. The UN Security 
Counci! explicitly referred to its powers under Chapter VII of lhe UN 
Charter when it made its decisions to establish the !wo principal forces in 
Somalia: 
a. Tlze US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAFj, lhe multi-state force 
under US command which operated in Somalia from December 
1992 to May 1993 ("). This is not generally regarded as a UN 
force, nor as apure peacekeeping force, but rather as a UN-autho-
(') Ali Agenda fur Peace. para. 20. 
(lO) UNITAF was authorized by se Res. 794 af 3 Dec. 1992. This explicitly bases 
it 011 ChDpter VII af the UN Charter. 
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rized force roughly comparable, so far as its legal basis and co=and 
system is concemed, to the US-Ied coalition forces in Korea in 1950-
-53 and in the Kuweit crisis in 1990-91. It had some liaison with 
the UN, and with the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNO-
SOM I), the UN peacekeeping force which had been set up earlier 
in 1992, and whose inability to fulfil its mandate had led to the 
creation of UNITAF. 
b. The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), which 
took over responsibilities and personnel from UNITAF in May 
1993. Although this is designated as a UN peacekeeping force, it 
was from the start a most unusual one. Its authorizing resolution 
departs in a number of ways from the traditional mandate of peace-
keeping forces. It explicitly refers to Chapter VII, and clearly leaves 
roam for a greater use of force than was typical for UN peacekeeping 
operations. 
Thus in the post-Cold War era to UN peacekeeping forces, UNPROFOR 
and UNOSOM II, have been set up largely in the framework of Chapter VII 
of the UN Chapter, and without relying on consent of the parties to quite 
the same extent as in earlier cases. This marks a very significant water-
shed in the history of the organization. 
This reduction in the emphasis 011 consent has happened for good 
reasons, which include a desire to overcome the past weaknesses of peaee-
keeping, as in the Middle East in 1967. There has also been a need for a 
new approaeh to the issue of consent because in situations of ehaos such 
as the UN has encountered recently a peacekeeping force eannot be allowed 
to have its entire eontinued existenee dependent on the whim of every 
local leader. 
Yet down-grading the consent of the parties as a key eriteron for 
action takes peacekeeping into dangerous territory, involving it in a series 
of tasks for which it was hardly ready. The very lack of a formal Charter 
framework for ali peacekeeping operations may have facilitated a tendency, 
evident in these cases, to regard peacekeeping as a flexible teehnique which 
can be radica11y adapted as regards its legal basis, its purposes, and its 
mode of operating; and to apply it to situations of great difficulty, where 
it is not necessarily appropriate. 
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Use of Force 
Directly associaled with lhe issue of consenl is lhe issue of readiness 
to use force. ln lhe pasl, UN forces had been empowered lo use force 
when directly Ihrealened, ar when Iheir cenlral aclivities were being openly 
opposed: bul Ihey had seldom aClually resorled to major uses of force. 
ln conneclion with some peacekeeping operalions in recenl years Ihere 
have been unprecedenled Ihreals and uses of force. Security Council reso-
lulion 836 of 4 June 1993, aulhorizing force in defence of UN safe areas 
in Bosnia, is a landmark in this regard. 
ln Namibia in April 1989, UN representatives authorized, or aI least 
tolerated, a South African use of force against infiltrators from SWAPO 
(lhe South West Africa People's Organizalion): Ihis was a necessary pre-
condilion for the success of the UN peacekeeping and election-monitoring 
operation. 
Evenls in a number of recenl conflicts, parlicularly those in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Somalia, have been seen as reiforcing lhe need to peace-
keeping lo have leeth. There has been proper revulsion over a situation 
in which parties lo a conflict can, aI will, slop the distribution of aid, 
prevent the rotation of UN peacekeeping troops, bombard cities, maintain 
cruel sieges, and commit war crimes: ali with UN forces looking on, and 
seemingly powerless to acto The calls for action have been made stronger 
by he fact that UN forces frequently assist the passage of journalists, whose 
reports on what they have seen inevitably lead to demands to put things 
right. 
An increased willingness to use force in support of UN purposes was 
apparent in certain passages of An Agenda for Peace. Enforcement was 
presented as an activity which would be likely to require separate and 
distinct forces: 
Cease--fires have oflen been agreed to but not complied with, and 
the United Nations has somelimes been caIled upon to send forces 
to restare and maintain lhe cease-fire. This task can on occasion 
exceed lhe mision of peace-keeping forces and the expeclations of 
peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council 
consider the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defi-
143 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
ned eireumstanees and with their terms of reference specified ln 
advanee C '). 
ln praetiee, what has happened has been different. The new breed of 
UN «peaee-enforeement units» envisaged in Ali Agellda for Peace has not 
been ereated. lnstead, the funetions envisaged for it have been assigned 
in an ad I10C manner to national forces (as in Namibia, and with certain US 
actions in Somalia), to NATO forces (as in the air exclusion zone over 
Bosnia and also in the Sarajevo exclusion zone) , and to UN peacekeeping 
forces themselves (as with certain aspects of the operations in former Yugos-
lavia and Somalia). 
One form of assoeiation of peacekeeping with a readiness to use force 
in preventive deployment. Since December 1992, part of UNPROFOR in 
former Yugoslavia has been stationed in Macedonia to discourage possible 
attacks on that former Yugoslav republico This kind of preventive deploy-
ment may have considerable potential, and is one of the most interesting 
new uses of peacekeeping forces. However, it is a much more directly 
military function than past peacekeeping eHor!s. It is not certain that the 
label «peacekeeping» is appropriate in such a case. 
The main practical problems arising from the greater willingness to use 
force in connection with peaeekeeping operations have arisen, not in the 
context of preventive deployments, but rather in cases of continuing conflict 
where action needs to be taken. When, as in Somalia and Bosnia, local 
parties defy existing agreements, and also the Security Council's pronoun-
cements, the demand for action becomes strong, but the dilemmas involved 
are difficult. 
The first dilcmma is that any strong use of force, by or on behalf of 
pcacekeepers, may help restare their credibility, but it may also increase 
the risks to lightly-armed peaeekeepers in vulnerable positions. As events 
in Somalia have suggested, they may be more exposed to attack, robbery, 
ar being taken hostage then they were before. Regarding Bosnia, this fear 
led to repeated discussion of the possibility that peacekeepers might have 
to be withdrawn before any military action was taken: in wich case, the 
mueh-diseussed «peacekeeping with muscles» would have involved a signi-
(li) An Agenda for Peace, parlJ. 44. 
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fieant diminution in the range of activities which peaeekeepers eould under-
take. 
The seeond dilemma, closeJy related to the first, is that the use of 
force in eomplex civil wars frequently involves killing and injuring eivilians 
as weU as armed adversaries. If sueh things happen, as they did in Somalia 
in 1993, aecusations of acting in a brutal 01' colonial manner are bound 
to be made: neither the UN nor its leading members are immune fram 
such aecusations. Military disasters may result from air strikes, from naval 
artillery bombardrnents, and from actions by ground forces. If sueh dangers 
are to be minimized, tbere is a need for local kowledge, first-classe intelli-
gence, good decision-making, and skilled performance of military tasks. 
Not ali UN forces and proeedures are notably strong in ali these respeets. 
The third dilemma is that some (though not ali) uses of force risk 
undermining perceptions of the impartiality of the particular peacekeeping 
force involved. Sueh forces often have grave difficulties in maintaining 
their impartiality anyway, especiaUy if, as in Bosnia, humanitarian aid is 
needed more by one side than by another. A peacekeeping force, like any 
other force in an alien land, needs local allies and supporters, and will 
nced them even more if it is engaged in hostilities. ln sueh circumstances, 
impartiality must be a casualty. There may even be some risk that the 
impartiality of UN peacekeeping forces generaUy, and indeed of the UN 
itself, may be undermined. 
The fourth dilemma is that, while the UN system of decision-making 
is not well geared to eontrolling major uses of force, there must be a reluc-
tance to leave the decision to others when the lives of peaeekeepers and 
the reputation of the UN are at stake. Henee the long and complex discus-
sions over the authority to use force in Bosnia - a malter in which national 
governments, NATO collectively, the UN Seeretary-General, the UN Seeurity 
Counei!, and the commanders of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia and 
Bosnia, aU felt entitled to have a key role, 01' even veto. The UN's lack 
of serious institutional machinery for long-term strategic planning of parti-
cular operations only reinforced the weakness of this processo 
Despite ali these di!emmas, the need for some intelligent means of 
using force in support of peacekeeping operations remains. If such means 
cmmot be found, those operations will inevitably suffer a decline in credi-
bility. lndeed, this already happened in 1993. The travails of the UN, and 
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of the Westem powers generally, in Bosnia and Somalia led to a decline 
in lheir credibility in certain other situations, including Haiti. 
Some attempts have been made to work out a new strategie role for 
lhe UN. Kofi Annan, UN Under-Seerelary-General for Peacekeeping Opera-
tions, said in an article in late 1993: 
Today's conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia have fundamentally red-
rawn the parameters. It is no longer enough to implement agreements 
or separate antagonists; the international community now wants 
the United Nations to demareate boundaries, contraI and eliminate 
heavy weapons, quell anarchy, and guarantee lhe delivery of 
humanitarian aid in war zones. These are elearly tasks lhat call 
for «teeth» and «muscle», in addition to lesse tangible qualities 
that we have sought in the pasto ln other words, lhere are increa-
sing demands that the United Nations now enforce lhe peaec, 
as orginally envisaged in lhe Charter ("). 
Kofi Annan suggested that NATO eould have a key role in the «peace-
keeping with teeth» he was advoealing. He saw the involvement of NATO 
in peacekeeping operations as a major way past the main obstacle to success 
whieh he identified in the artiele - namely the reluctance of member states 
to translate commitment into action through supply of funds and forces. 
His article foreshadowed the discriminate and effeclive uses of air power 
in February 1994 in Bosnia, both to enforce the controls on artillery in 
the Sarajevo exclusion zone, and to stop military f1ights by belligerents. 
Yet tbis use of the threat and reality of air power, although it contributed 
to decisions to send additional Russian and British troops to Bosnia, has 
not totally transformed the general reluctance of states to commit ground 
forces in Bosnia while lhe risks there remain bigh. This reluctance is lhe 
product of faetors which are enduring and not necessarily discreditable: 
a worry that the aims of an operation may be uneertain, mistaken, ar the 
subjeet of disagreement between major powers; a nervousness about ris-
king lives in a eonfliet in whieh national interests do not seem to be direetly 
(12) Kofi A. Annan. «UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO». 
NATO Review, vaI. 41, no. 5 (October 1993), p. 4. 
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engaged; and a fear that major uses of force by peacekeepers could simply 
drag the UN down to hte levei of the belligerents. 
Force, and the tbreat of force, have a role in the new peacekeeping. 
However, any applications of force has to be discrimina te both in the choice 
of situations in which it is brought to bear, and in the timing and manuer of 
its application. To rush into a generalized advocacy of the use of force, on 
a misguided assumption that the UN can succeed where so many states 
and empires have failed, is to invite disaster. The risks in the expansion 
of the concept of peacekeeping which were are currently witnessing, and 
of proposals for increased willingness to use force, are obvious. Major 
military activities in the name of peacekeeping may get mired in eontroversy. 
and tainted by failure. ln the process, it is possible that traditional peace· 
keeping could suffer - with serious effeets both on the willingness of states 
to agree to the presenee of such forces, and the willingness of donor coun-
tries to porvide the desperately needed funds and forces without which 
no peaeekeeping operation can get off the ground. 
Illvolvement of lhe Permanenl Five and Olher Powers 
Since 1992, peacekeeping operations have involved participation by 
military units from ali five permanent members of the Security Counci!, 
and from neighbours or near-neighbours (such as Thais and Chinese 
in Cambodia). They have also involved participation from powers which 
had hitherto been constitutionally prevented from sending their armed 
forces into action abroad (lapan and Germany, in Cambodia and Somalia 
respectively). These developments suggest that peacekeeping operations 
have become a symbol of the deterrnination of the intemational community 
to see its decisions implemented. They constitute additional evidence that 
peacekeeping has a more coercive aspect than hitherto. They also pose pro-
blems: major powers are naturally anxious to keep a degree of control 
over their forces, and there are inevitably concems that their forces may 
reflect national military styles, and may serve national as well as intema-
tional purposes .. The US participation in UNOSOM II in Somalia from 
May 1993 to March 1994 provided a vivid and at times tragic illustration 
of such problems. 
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4. lN WHAT TYPES OF CRISIS CAN UN PEACEKEEPING USEFULLY 
BE INVOLVED? 
ln face of the crises which have now arisen, especially in Angola, 
Bosnia, and Somalia, a crucial issue to address is: in which types Df situa-
tion is peacekeeping appropriate, and in which not? 
For its first several decades, virtually ali UN peacekeeping was in 
areas which had experienced European colonialism and subsequent deco· 
lonization. ln these areas, common problems of decolonization were en· 
countered. New states emerged which lacked legitimate borders, regimes, 
and institutions; and in some cases lacked a notion Df civic identity. ln 
many parts of the post-colonial world the great powers could agree on 
keeping out of such conflicts, and trying to prevent their internationali-
zation. ln these circumstances, handling the malter through UN peacekeeping 
was usually a convenient, and sometimes an effective, approach. 
It is notorious that the interposition Df lightIy-armed UN peacekeeping 
forces only really had an eHect Iocally when there was already some willio-
goess 00 the part of warriog states ar groups to stick to a cease-fire: as 
there was, at various times, in Cyprus, aod also betwecn Israel and some 
of its neighbours. True, UN peacekeepers did aIso eventuaIly sueeeed io 
what tumed out to be a thoroughIy interventionist military missioo in the 
Congo io the 1960s. Bul that experience, whieh wos traumatic for the UNo 
ilIustrated the difficulties aod well as the possibilities of a more direct 
military role. 
The use of UN forces in civil wars has increased markedly io receot 
years, incIuding in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Georgia, Mozambique, 
Rwaoda, Somalia, and former YugosIavia. Tragic circumstaoces have led to 
persuasive caIls for intervention, to which the UN has in many cases res-
ponded. This vastly increased use of UN peacekeeping and observer forces 
io bilter intra-state as well as inter-state eooflicts raises serious probIems ("). 
ln many of tllese cases there has not been an effective cease-fire, nor 
even any dear front lines; and the probIems confronting UN forces have 
challenged many traditional assumptions of peacekeeping, induding the 
(l~) For thoughtful recent analyscs. see Gouldlng, «The Evolution oI UN Peacekeeping», 
pp. 451-64; and Allln James, «Internal Pcace·kceping: A Oead End for the UN?)), Security 
Dialogue, vaI. 24, no. 4 (Dccember 1993), pp. 359-68. 
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principies of operating on the basis of consent, impartiality between the 
parties, and non-use of force except in self-defence. These recent interven-
tions also raise a deeper questiono Is such a pattem of intervention justified, 
ar is the UN, at least in some cases, taking on problems which it is in fact 
incapable of solving? 
Some of the challenges now faced by the UN are not in themselves of 
a wholly new character: there have been some bitter civil and intemational 
wars in earlier decades (for example, in China before the 1949 revolution, 
in Vietnam for thirty years after 1946, and in Nigeria in the late 1960s) 
in which the UN did not get directly involved. What is new is not so 
much the number of conflicts, but rather the Security Council's ability to 
reach a decision to act in many (though by no means ali) cases. 
A secand, and equally serious, set of challenges of the post-Cold 
War era are those posed by the process of fission in the collapsed states 
of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. The crises arising 
from the disintegration of these federal states have proved in some respects 
no less difficult tllan the crises following European decolonization a 
generation carlier. They have raised questions about the appropriateness 
of asserting the instant and undifferentiated applicability of certain vital 
principies derived from the somewhat different context of inter-state rela-
lions. The principie that the changing of frontiers by force can never be 
accepted is fundamental in contemporary intemational relations, and was 
immediately invoked by the intemational co=unity in connection with the 
Yugoslav crisis (U). II was held to be applicable both because of the charac-
terization of the crisis as a conflict between states, and because dangerous 
precedents could be set by successful grabs for territory on largely ethnic 
grounds. Yet ther must be a question as to whether it was wise to express this 
legal principie so forcefully in the special conlext of the disintegration of 
federal slates where, as in this case, some of the existing <<frontiers» have 
no physical existence and lack both logic and legitimacy, where there are 
such deepseated ethnic problems, Dnd where almost any hnaginable out-
(14) Sec e. g. the DccIaration af 3 Septo 1991 af thc CSCE states; se Res. 713 af 25 
Septo 1991, and nurncrous subsequent Security Councll resolutions; the Statement 00 the 
Situation in Yugoslavia, issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Reme, 7·8 Nov. 
1991, para. 2; and the Statement af Principies adopted on 26 Aug 1992 by the London 
Confereoce 00 the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para. II. 
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come shorl of massive conflagration involves some de facto success for 
Ihose who have sought lo change fronliers by force. 
II is sobering lo reflecI Ihal foIlowing European decolonizalion lhe 
laboa againsl changing fronliers by force operated more or less effectively 
for decades: whereas in parts of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviel 
Union, it broke down within weeks or months of the achievement of inde-
pendenee. There remain many problems in these areas whieh may yel 
draw in lhe UN, and risk involving it in deep and unrewarding entan-
glemenls. ln former Yugoslavia, as if there were nol already crises and 
conflicls enough, there is the possibility of a deeper UN involvement in 
Bosnia, eroatia, and Maeedonia; nol to menlion within Serbia, where lhe 
vulnerable position of Albanians in Kosovo, and Hungarians in Vojvodina, 
may yel lead to pressures to inlervene. ln the forme r Soviel Union, Ihere 
are already several major wars within and between suceessor republics. 
There is no reason, aparl from prudenee and exhaustion, why lhe 
UN should not involve itself directly in the post·Soviet conflicls - Or at any 
rale in the Ones which can be considered inler·stale in charaeler. ln facto 
however, lhe UN as an institulion, and its leading member states, have 
been nervous aboul getting involved in Ihese conflicts in lhe ex-URSS. 
There have been many UN missions there, but no serious UN peacekeeping 
operations aparl fram the very smaIl and near-irrelevanl UN Observer 
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). This reluctance of oulside powers, and 
of the UN, to get involved in peacekeeping in the former Soviet Uniml 
poses an awkward problem. Those who advocate a universal and consis-
tent system of UN peacekeeping need to lake account of the understan-
dable weariness of instilutions and states when faced wilh so daunting an 
array of conflicls. A regional approach may be required. 
The Russian goverrunent clearly realises that the inlernalional commu· 
llity is not abou! lo launch into a major series of peacekeeping operations 
in the former Soviet Union. lnslead, iI is seeking some kind of inlernalio· 
nal associalion with actions thal may be taken in the «near abroad». On 
4 February 1994, Russian defence minister Pavel Graehev appealed for a 
strang UN mandate to carry out peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet 
republics. He was quoted as saying: «Some Western countries reproach 
us for sending too rew peacekeepers to Bosnia, but we have already alloca-
ted more than 16 000 servicemen to carry out peaeekeeping missions in 
the former Soviet Union. We carry out an important task and deserve 
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a stonger UN mandate to accomplish it ("). Needless to say, the govern-
ment of many formeI' Soviet republics view such statements as evidence of a 
sinister atlempt to recreate a collapsed empire. It is certainly true that any intel'-
ventions are bound to have a different character from any known form 
of UN peacekeeping. However, this is not a reason to reject the Russian 
appeal out of hand: the international community could engage in a serious 
dialogue with Russia about the circumstances, legal basis, nationaI composi-
lion, and functions of future peacekeeping missions in the formeI' Soviel 
Union. 
The problems involved in any such missions are vasto The situations 
which the post-Cold War arder has thrown up - Somalia, formeI' Yugosla-
via, and lhe formeI' Soviet Union providing the clearest examples - are in 
many cases peculiarly difficuJt to tackle by means of UN peacekeeping. 
I n particular: 
- There is no reliahle cease-fire hetween lhe parties, so fighting 
continues. 
- The bewildering array of non-state and state entitics involved, and 
of regular and guerrilla forces, mean lhat it is unclear which indivi-
duai leaders actually have the capacity to reach agreements and 
implement them. 
- There is no single, stahle ar clear front line between the parties of 
a kind which a peacekeeping force might be ahle to patrol. 
- Peacekeeping troops dispatched to lhese countries are in a situation 
of great danger, and protecting themselves may well find that they 
have to lean toward, 01' against, particular parties to a dispute, thus 
endangering their much-valued impartiality. 
One could conclude from ali this that the UN must confine its activi-
ties rigidly to situations in which it can stick safely to what is seen (rightly 
01' wrongly) as the classic approach to peacekeeping: operating wilh consent 
of the parties, avoiding the use of force except in immediate self-defence, 
and mantaining impartiality between the parties to a conflic!. Whethel' 
01' not there ever was apure golden age of peacekeeping, such a simple 
retum to the old approach seems inadequate. Peacekeeping has changed 
(15) Reuter repotl from Moscow. /lIternational Herald Tribune, London, 5-6 February 
1994, p. 4. 
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because its old incarnations had faults, and also because the challenges it 
faces have changed. New approaches are certain1y needed in face of new 
chalIenges. 
Yet new approaches will be of no use whatsoever if those involved 
in UN decision-making adopt an unimaginative and mechanica! approach 
to their implementation. There is a stl"ong tendency in UN circles to taIk 
of «preventive diplomacy», «preventive deployment», «peacekeeping», «peace 
makim>, and «peace-enforcement», as if between them these techniques 
constituted a full set of UN toaIs for addressing virtualIy any problem. 
They do no!. There are many problems, of many types, which have eluded 
the best efforts of statesmen to address them over centuries, and will do 
so again. If we are to grasp the rea! opportunities which the present moment 
in international history offers, we need to temper our enthusiasm with a 
sense of tragedy, an awareness of the sheer difficulty of problems now 
being faced, and a recognition that every crisis is unique. There are no 
reach-me-down tool-kits ar alI-purpose answers. 
The pressures on an international organization to tackle alI problems 
impartially, in accord with agreed criteria, are very great. Unlike states, 
the UN cannot simply proelaim lack of direct interest in a conflict as a 
reason for non-involvement. Hence An Agenda for Peace becomes, only 
too easily, an agenda for endless involvement. This agenda - with its 
unpalatable consequences in terms of burdens undertaken, peacekeepers' 
lives lost, heavy expense, and politicaI fall-out - inevitably produces its 
own reaction. AlI sorts of agendas appear on how not to get involved in 
distan! conflic!s. 
It is some!imes suggested that the UN should simply steer clear of 
civil wars. It was not designed to tackle them, its Charter does not deal 
with them and many involvements in civil wars have been costly and unre-
warding. However, such a mie of thumb, saving the UN from involve-
ment in one major elass of trouble, could hardly work in practice. Many, 
even most, civil wars are a180 at thc sarne time internationaI wars, 01' at 
least have a large and potentially dangerous international dimensiono Fur-
ther, the UN has had some nolable successes in helping end certain largely 
internal conflicts, including in El Salvador and Cambodia C'). 
('6) For a b.:tlanced discussion of the diUiculty af tackling civil wars, see Alan James, 
«Internal Peace-keeping: A Dead End for the UN?}). 
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An attempt to devise an even more radical rule of thumb fOl' avoiding 
foreign involvement is the division of the world into «zones of peace» and 
«zones of 'turmoil». ln this view, 85 per cent of the world is assigned to 
the latter category, and there is littIe to be done about it ("l. This pessi. 
mistic approach, reminiscent of ancient divisions of the world into «civi· 
lized nations» and «barbarians», is hardly a complete description of the 
world, the troubles of which are not neady parcelled into zones. Yet it 
has strengths, inc1uding in its appeal to an understandable isolationist ins-
tinct in the USA following periods of heavy overseas involvement and 
numerous disappointments. 
Other attempts to devise criteria to limit UN activities have included 
President Clinton's speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 
27 September 1993, in which he warned against the UN's reach exceeding 
its grasp, and suggested conditions for US participation in new missions, 
inc1uding: 
- Is there a real threat to internalional peace? 
- Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? 
- Can an end point to UN participation be seen? 
- How much does it cost? 
These suggested conditions are hardly new, or are they problem-free. 
ln particular, the charactedstic and understandable US anxiety to work 
out in advance an end-point to an operation, coupled with the equaIly 
understandable US worry about casuaIties, can actually encourage local 
leaders in a course of obstinacy, knowing that they can oudast an embat-
tled peacekeeping force. Problems such as these - as well as difficuIties 
over sensitive issues of funding, and also subjecting US troops to foreign 
command - help to explain the repeated de1ays in 1993 and early 1994 
in finalising President Clinton's long-awaited policy document, or Presiden-
tial Decision Directive, on the subject of peacekeeping and peace-enfor-
cement. 
(11) Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real lVorld Order: Zones 01 Peace, ZOIlE'S 
of Turmoil, Chatham House Publishers, Chatham, New Jersey, 1993. 
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There is simply no substitute for the exercise of judgement about invoJ-
vement ar non-involvement in particular conflicts. Above ali, in lhe posl-
-Cold War era, the members of the Security Council need lo be discrimi-
naling bolh in which problems Ihey lackle, and the manner in which they 
do soo They need lo be discriminating in !wo ways: (1) There is sometimes 
a case for deciding nol lo lackle a problem, even ii it is desperalely seri-
ous, and even if it constitutes a Ihreal lo internationa! peace and security. 
lf Ihere is insufficient will lo slay the course, ar no clear idea of whal 
solution the UN seeks lo bring about, ar no adequale local basis for seeing 
to lhe implementalion of a seltlemenl, it may be best for lhe UN lo avoid 
underlaking a burden which is likely lo end with a humilialing exil. (2) ln 
cases where lhe UN does decide lo seI up a peacekeeping operalion, it 
needs lo have a elear overall stralegic purpose, and an operalion geared 
lo the particular needs of the country. Yet the UN is not always good 
at long-term strategic thinking. One of the reasons for this is inherent ;n 
the whole process of multilateral diplmaey. It is very diffieult lo gel ali 
lhe members of the Security Council lo agree on the terms of resolulions 
dealing with immediate crises, without worrying aboul long-Ierm goals, 
consideratioll of which can always wait. 
5. WHAT KEY ISSUES NOW NEED TO BE ADDRESSED? 
Despile ils current difficulties, UN peacekeeping still has some solid 
qualities which it should not lose in the new era. UN peacekeeping is still, 
in many parIs of the world, acceptable in a way Ihal a purely national 
ar even regional mililary presence would not be. Further, UN peacekeeping 
has an impressive record of achievemenl in isolating some cooflicls from 
regional 01' great power rivalry. 
The UN hao been compelled to confront lhe severe problems of peace-
keeping in situations of endemic conflicl, bul is bound lo have gravc 
diificulty in coming up wilh answers. The problem is nol jusl Ihal lhe 
UN lacks a satisfaclory command syslem capable of laking quick decisions 
and able to coordinale effectively lhe many differenl Iypes of force and 
nalional conlingents deployed. There is as yel liltle sign of lhe emergence 
of a salisfaclory doclrine 01' praclice regarding operations which have an 
essenlially hybrid charaeler, involving elemenls of both peacekeeping and 
enforcemenl. 
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An important question of terminology follows. It must doubtful whe· 
ther it is right to hi-jack lhe respected term «peacekeeping» and apply it to 
actions whieh are not based on the full eonsent of ali the parties, and which 
involve extensive use of force. Is Ihere not something Orwellian about 
this, as also in sueh terms as «peace-enforcemen!»? Tuming a familiar 
saying on its head, one could comment on much recent action and discus· 
sion in the field of peacekeeping: «C'est magnifique, mais c'est la guerre.» 
And yet what bas happened undoubtedly represents an evolution of peace· 
keeping, has preserved some of its charaeteristies, and has overcome some 
of its earlier weaknesses. Jt would be politicaIly impractical, and doctrinally 
unwise, to try to give current UN multi-national military operations a new 
name. 
The extent of UN control over peaeekeeping operations remains ine-
vitably unclear. The experience of peacekeeping operations in several coun-
tries, particularly Yugoslavia and Somalia, has exposed lhe problematic 
relation between UN command and nationaI command. States supplying 
rorces, and their commanders in the field, have remained independent 
decision-makers, reluetant to defer to UN command, especially in malters 
relating to the safety of their troops, or to the use of air power ar other 
advanced weaponry. Indeed, the simple proposition could be advanced: 
the greater the elements of military risk in an operation, the more will 
govemments be nervous about handing over control of their forces to the UN. 
If peacekeeping is to adapt successfully to even some of the difficult 
pl"Oblems it is asked to tackle. the following issues must be addressed. 
n. Criteria lar Iflvolveme/1t i/1 Particular COlllliels 
As disappointment with the idea of a universal system of peacekeeping 
grows. there is an urgent need for reconsideration of the criteria to be 
used by national govemments, and by the UN, in discussions about whe-
ther peacekeeping forces are an appropriate response to particular conflicts. 
There are signs that states are retreating from the idea of universal obli-
gations in defence of intemational norms jnto a reliance on the familiar, 
and sometimes extremely limited, eoncept of national interest. While such 
a reaction is inevitable, there is a need to cinsider other criteria as well. 
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The most important is whether a given conflict is of such a type that the 
UN has a significant compara tive advantage in addressing it. 
b. Ma/lagemc/lt by lhe Security Cou/lcil a/ld Secretariat 
The methods of decision-making and management in respect of UN 
peacekeeping operations are odd and are likely to come under increasing 
scrutiny ("). Indeed, the more the UN has to be discriminating about its 
involvements, the more important it will be that its decisions are seen 
to be the work of bodies whose composition is accepted as legitimate, 
and whose work is procedurally fair. 
Defects in the actual management of peacekeeping forces are co=on1y 
said to be the result of «UN bureaucracy», but that broadbrush accusation 
often misses the mark. The so-called bureaucracy is actually quite small, 
and among its numerous problems are the need to follow procedural arran-
gements established by the General Assembly; and to abide by rules and 
regulations which result from attempts to ensure financial efficiency. The 
requirements for competitive bidding for materiais needed by forces in 
the field, imposing as they to tenible delays, are a nolorious case in point. 
On central problem so far as management is concerned is the lack 
of a serious acceptance of responsibility by any one individual ar country 
for the efficient running of an operation. When things go wrong, the UN 
system provides far too many possibilities of buck-passing, not only within 
lhe organization, but more importantly between member states on the one 
hand the organization on the other. Many things are going wrong in peace-
keeping at the moment - so much so that the Security Council and the 
Secretariat may come to be seen as t1lOroughly fillíble bodies. The question 
is bound to arise: what realistically can be dane to prevent the recurrence 
of mistakes and disasters? There will on1y be a real interest in the impor-
tant cause of improving the UN management of peacekeeping forces jf 
there is also confidence in the judgements made at the UN. The answer 
from national capitais may well be the dismal one that states will become 
more, not less, cautious about contributing money and forces for UN opera-
tions. 
(Ii) For a fine survey, see Mats R. BerdaI, Whither UN Peacekeeping?, Adelphi Papcr 
281, Intcmational Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1993. 
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c. Intelligence, Command and Contrai 
ln difficult and dangerous operations, officers naturrally want the 
best sytems of intelligence, and the best fonns of eommand and eontrol, 
that they ean ge!. They need quiek decisions, and ones in which they ean 
have some trust. Inevitably, at present they tend to fall baek onto the 
resourees of their own eountries in these matters. Thus a multi-national 
peacekeeping force may have differenl eonlingents pulling in differenl direc-
tions. Any answer lo this problem needs to go well beyond the action taken 
in 1993 - the creation of the «situation roam» aI UN Headquarters in 
New York, intended to keep lines open to ali ongoing peacekeeping opera-
tions aI the sarne time. Among olher aclions needed is the appointmenl, for 
each operation, of a better equipped directing group, with more resourses 
aI its disposal. There is a very strong case for setting up an integrated task 
force aI UN Headquarters for each peacekeeping operation. 
It remains an open question whether such a directing group mighl 
sometimes be best created on a nalional basis, and answerable to its coun-
try's institutiollS, rather than on an international basis, answerable to the 
Secretary-General and the Security Council. It may be Ihal the demands 
of peacekeeping in situalions of great danger will lead to peacekeeping -like 
the authorization of force in Korea and the Gulf - being «subcontracted» 
to a particular country 01' regional organization, which would play a lead 
role in a given operation. Despite obvious failings, such as lhose of the 
US in Somalia, states may sometimes be betler at long-term management 
of operations than is the UNo Syria's role in Lebanon has in some respects 
been more effective lhan lhose of eilher the UN 01' the multi-national 
peacekeeping forces which have operated there. 
d. Use Df Force by Dr on Behalf Df Peacekeepillg Forces 
Peacekeepers in contemporary confliets have been under intense pres-
sure to use force for various purposes, inc1uding of humanitarian relief, 
punishment of attacks on UN personnel, prevention of atroeilies 01' flagrant 
aggression, and compelling parties who have agreed to a peace settlement 
to comply with iI. Such pressure to take military action has raised several 
problems. UN troops may have lo choose between losing credibility and 
losing impartiaJity. They risk being perceived simply as one additional 
157 
NAÇAO E DEFESA 
beIligerent party. They may readi1y become targets for retaliation. ln many 
situations, UN peacekeeping forces must of necessity avoid major uses of 
force. They may be of insufficien! size, !acking in major armaments, restric-
ted by their mandates and the views of their nationa! goverlll11ents, and 
lacking the popular politicaI support to engage in major offensive operations. 
Yet the costs of miJitary inaction by UN forces may be high. As in 
Yugoslavia, UN forces may be formally defined as a protection force, yet 
unable to protect beleaguered local communities. They may be unable 
to prevent or punish visible and continuing atrocities. The situations in 
Bosnia, until the developments of February 1994, exposed the stark pro-
blems of attempting a peacekeeping operation in a situation where therc 
is no peace to keep. The Bosnian Muslims' perceplion of an ineffectual 
UN was compounded by its arms embargo on former Yugoslavia, which 
has affected them heavily: they argue that this deprived them of the righl 
of self-defence at a time when the UN was unable to provide any other 
protection. 
The UN Security Council will have to be willing to authorize cerlain 
uses of force in conneclion with peacekeeping operations, especially in 
situations of endemic civil war. US uses of force in Somalia in 1993, and 
NATO's uses of air power in Bosnia in February 1994, are illustrations 
of a significant trend in lhis direction. Yet ensuring that any use of force 
is geared to realizable objectives and remains controlled is astonishingly 
difficult. There is bound to be a risk of UN forces behaving like a belea-
guered colonial garrison. It is very hard to achieve faimess and balance 
in lhe nse of force within a country, as between lhe various parties to a 
conflict; and it is equaUy hard to achive anylhing like faimess and balance 
in the choice of conflicts in which force is authorized. There are almos! 
bound lo be accusations of «double standards». 
e. The Question of Privileging UN Forces 
Wilh peacekeeping troops in obvious danger in many contemporary 
conflicts, a peculiarly difficult question is emerging, or rather re-emerging. 
When UN peacekeeping forces are involved in hostilities, are they to be 
regarded (at least for the purposes of the operation of the laws of arrned 
conflict) simply as beIligerents, on an equal footing with other parties? 
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Or are they in some way in a superior posUlon (")7 ln recent years there 
has been a reviva! of lhe idea that UN forces are entitled to receive assis-
tance and cooperation from local parties, at least when carrying out such 
tasks as delivery of humanitarian aid. This can easily lead to the argument 
that lhose who oppose ar threaten UN forces are in some way «outIaws». 
While it is natural to want to give UN forces a privileged status as against 
other parties, there are potential dangers in any doctrine ar practice of 
this kind. It could lead to a new kind of colonial mentality, and to a general 
undermining of the laws of war because UN forces failed to treat their adver-
saries as legitimate belligerents. 
UN peacekeeping and observer forces are inevitably involved in other 
complex issues connected with the laws of war, ar what is now widely calIed 
intemational humanitarian law. For example, the conflicts in former Yugos-
lavia have forced them to confront the issue of how to respond to massive 
violations of the most basic rules of war by belligerents. lnasmuch as a 
cIear answer has emerged, it appears to be lhat information on violations 
may be recorded and passed on, at least by some national contingents throu-
gh lheir own national authorities; but UN peacekeepers have not yet been in-
volved in actualIy arresting suspected war criminais and holding them for tria!. 
Quite apart from such intemational legal issues, the expansion of 
UN peacekeeping activities has highlighted a huge range of ethical and 
disciplinary issues: there have been reports of UN personnel being invol-
ved in the illicit sale of diesel oil, use of child prostitutes, and illegal smuggling. 
As welI as better training (dicussed below), such practices point to the 
need for a stronger and more uniform code of discipline. 
f. The Changing Meaning of Impartiality 
ln UN peacekeeping, impartiality is no longer in practice interpreted 
to mean in every case impartiality between the parties to a conflict. ln 
some conflicts there may, and perhaps should, be more toughness with 
one party lhan wilh anolher, ar more aid to one than another. ln several 
cases since 1988 in which UN peacekeeping has been involved, there have 
(Iii) For earlier discussions. see e. g. the 1971 Zagreb Resolution af the Institute af 
Intemational Law on «Conditions of Application af Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict 
to Hostilities in which United Natiens Forces MBY Be Engaged», reprinted in Adam 
Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War, 2nd edn., Oxford 
University Press, 1989, pp, 371-5. 
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also been eeonomie sanetions against a particular state ar party. There havc 
also been some arms embargoes. Yet there are important elements in the 
notion of impartiality whieh should not be lost, inc1uding the idea that 
the UN represents a set of interests, values and tasks which are distinct 
in some respects from those of any one belligerent. ln some operations, 
«impartiality •• may have come to mean, not impartiality between the belli· 
gerenls, bul impartiality in earrying oul Security Couneil decisions. 
g. The Question of Permanent Armed Forces 
The idea of a standing UN force eomprised of professionals reeruited 
on a volunlary basis has been advanced by Sir Brian Urquhart ("). There 
has also been some discussion of having UN slanding forces on some olher 
basis - for example through the hitherto moribund Artic1e 43 of the Char· 
ter. Sueh proposals are not limited to peaeekeeping. A slanding force along 
one ar olher of these lines would have the merit that it would give the 
Secrelary·General andJ ar the Security Counei! a eapacity for a fast mi!itary 
response in certain crises, for example in assisting a state threalened by 
external attack. However, the proposal faces problems. The sheer variety 
of tasks tackled by the UN make it improbable that a standing force could 
be ready for aU of them. The proposal is of limited relevanee to certain key 
challenges faced by lhe UN. Somalia and Bosnia have east doubt on the 
eapabilities of even quite large professional forces to earry out difficult 
lasks: in these cases it is more the faet of involvement, the specific mandates 
of the forces, and the deeision.making procedures under which they operate, 
which are lhe main issues for debate. Further, the volunteer force proposal 
has run up against the familiar problem that governments seem resistant to 
the idea of endowing the UN with an independent mi!itary capacity, and 
to financing iI. 
h. IlIvolvement iII Admillis/ra/ioll and Trusteeship 
ln countries in which the UN has heeome involved in peacekeeping 
because of a general breakdown of government, the organization and its 
leading members are deeply reluctant to take over responsibility for governo 
(2<1) See Brian Urquhart, «For a UN Volunteer Military Force», New York Revicw 
Df Books, 10 June 1993, pp. 2-4, and comments in subscquent issues. 
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menl. For the mos! part the UN role in government has been eonfined 
to administrative assistance, training, helping to hold or monitor elections, 
and generally giving advice. ln some countries where govemement scarcely 
exists, such roles are inadequate, and the question of a more direct if hope-
fu11y temporary administration has to be addressed. NaturalIy it is not a 
popular subject to raise. We may be in an imperial situation today, but 
who are the imperialists? Except in cases of regional hegemony, old-fashio-
ned forms of the direct exercise of dominance are out of fashion. No 
country is rushing to take up the White Man's Burden. ln some circums-
tances there may be good reasons to establish a temporary extemally-im-
posed administrative system, at least when such a proposal has the active 
support of alI parties to a dispute_ The ahsence of an administrative role 
may some times have the effect of restricting the options available to UN 
forces to primarily military ones. 
i. Language 
UN forces are often crippled hy language prohlems. of two kinds. Firsl. 
different contingents in lhe sarne force may have great difficulty in commu-
nicating with each other: Ihere have been much-publicized cases of this 
in Bosma. Second, the contingents may not he ahle lo communicate eHec-
tively with lhe local population: this is particularIy crippling where there 
is a need for intelligence, policing and administration. 
j. Training 
Troops involved in UN peacekeeping forces have becn, and are, of 
extraordinarily uneven quality. Despite the UN's urgent need for such 
forces, there must he a higher basic standard which forces are required 
to meet before Ihey can be dispatched in a peacekeeping mode. This is 
one matter which some states and their armed forces are aIready beginning 
to address. 
k. Finance 
Setting up a UN peacekeeping operation has been aptly called a 
«financial bungee jump». Peacekeeping is in a more or less continuous 
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state of financial crisis. The system of apportionment of peacekeeping c051s 
among UN member states has caused problems with various major powers. 
The United States has long been expected to bear over 30 per cent of the 
costs and wants that figure reduced to 25 per cen1. Russia is also con· 
cerned about tbe present system, partly because it faces heavy tasks main· 
taining arder in its immediate environment. By contrast, over 150 states 
are apportioned for peacekeeping at either one tenth or one fiftb of their 
regular UN dues: a situarion which requires some modification. 
ln conclusion, tbe problems which peacekeeping now faces, and will 
go on facing in coming years, are such as to confirm that we are very far 
still from any form of global governance that involves a truly global capacity 
for peacekeeping. The system of UN peacekeeping is, and is likely to 
remain, patchy, ad hoc, and more appropriate to some situations than 10 
others. It is vital tbat its achievements, its reputation, and its future possibi· 
Iities should not be undermined by its application to too many conflie1s, 
and by failure to address some of the hard questions it now faces. 
Adam Robert, 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF UN PEACEKEEP1NG AND OBSERVER 
FORCES (*) 
This is a ehronological list of the the thirty-three UN peacekeeping and 
observer forces whose eomposition includes military ar poliee units eontri-
buted for the purpose by member states. This list does not refer to smaller 
speeial missions, investigatory paneis, eleetion monitors where there was 
no peaeekeeping element, advisory groups, ar deployments of UN guards. 
Nor does it include the UN authorized forces in Korea 1950-3 and in the 
Gulf 1990-1, nor the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia in 1992-3. 
Information is given in the form: Name of force (aeronym), loeation. 
years of operation, a principal authorizing resolution. Maximum streng/h 
Strenght on 31 Mareh 1993 (if applieable). There are some variations on this 
formato especially as regards recently established forces. 
(a) Established Up to 1978 
1. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), severa! areas 
in the Middle East, 1948-?, SC Res. 54 of 15 July 1948. Maximum 
strength: 572 (1948). Strength in March 1993: 239. 
2. United Nations Military Observer Group in lndia and Pakistan 
(UNMOGIPj, Jammu and Kashmir, 1949-7, SC Res. 47 of 21 April 1948. 
Maximum strength: 102 (October 1965). Strength in March 1993: 38. 
3. United Nations Emergeney Force (UNEF I), Suez Canal, Sinai, Gaza, 
1956-67, GA Res. 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 and GA Res. 1001 
(ES-I) of 7 November 1956. Maximum strength: 6073 (February 1957). 
4. United Naliuns ObserveI' Oroup in Lebanon (UNO GIL) , Lebanon, 1958, 
se Res. 128 of 11 June 1958. Maximum strength: 591 (November 1958). 
(0$) This list is adapted from the one published in Roberts and Kingsbury (eds.), 
United NatiollS, Divided World, 2nd edn., 1993. pp. 53841. Information 00 last four opera-
tion~ listed i~ from Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
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5. United Natiol1s Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies 
paur le Congo=ONUC), Republic Df the Congo, 19604, SC Res. 143 
Df 14 July 1960. Maximum strength: 19828 (July 1961). 
6. United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), established 
to assist the United Nations Temporary Executive Agency (UNTEA), 
West lrian, 1962-3, GA Res. 1752 (XVII) of 21 Septembel' 1962. Maxi-
mum strength: 1576. 
7. United Nations Yemen Obsevation Mission (UNYOM), Yemen, 1963-4, 
SC Res. 179 of 11 June 1963. Maximum strength: 189. 
8. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFICYPj, Cyprus, 
1964-?, SC Res, 186 of 4 March 1964. Maximum strength: 6411 (June 
1964). Strength in March 1993: 1531. 
9. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican 
Republic (DOMREP), Dominican Republic, 1965·6, SC Res. 203 Df 
14 May 1965. Strength: 2. 
10. United Nations lndia-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOMj, India-
-Pakistan bordel', 1965-6, se Res. 211 of 20 Septembel' 1965. Maximum 
strength: 96 (October 1965). 
11. United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF IIj, Suez Canal, Sinai, 
1973-9, SC Res. 340 of 25 October 1973. Maximum strcngth: 6973 
(February 1974). 
12. United Natiolls Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOFj, Golan Heights, 
1974-?, se Res. 350 Df 31 May 1974. Authorized strength: 1450. Strength 
in March 1993: 1121. 
13. United NatiollS lnterim Force in Lebanon (UNIFILj, southern Lebanon, 
1978-?, SC Res. 425 and 426 of 19 March 1978. Authol'ized strength: 
7000. Strength in March 1993: 5216. 
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(b) Established Since 1988 
14. United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(UNGOMAPi, Mghanistan and Pakistan, April 1988-Mareh 1990, se 
Res. 622 of 31 Oetober 1988. Maximum strength: 50 (May 1988). 
15. United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOGi, Iran 
and Iraq, August 1988-February 1991, se Res. 598 of 20 ruly 1987 
and se Res. 619 of 9 August 1988. Strength 399 (fune 1990)_ 
16. United Nations Angola Verifica/ion Mission (UNA VEM li, Angola, 
r!UlUary 1989-rune 1991, se Res. 626 of 20 Deeember 1988. Maximum 
strength: 70 (April-Deeember 1989). 
17. United Na/ions Transi/ion Assis/ance Group (UNTAGi, Namibia and 
Angola, April 1989-Mareh 1990, se Res. 435 of 29 September 1978 
and se Res_ 632 of 16 February 1989. Maximum military strength: 
4493 (November 1989). 
18. Uni/ed Na/ions Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), Costa 
Rica, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Niearagua, Deeember 1989-
-ranuary 1992, se Res. 644 of 7 November 1989. Maximum strength: 
1098 (May 1990). 
19. Uni/ed Na/ions Iraq-Kmvait ObserveI' Mission (UNIKOMJ, Kuwait-
-Iraq DMZ, April 1991-?, se Res. 689 of 9 Apdl 1991 and se Res. 806 
af 5 February 1993. Authorized strength: 500. Strength in March 1993: 
71 troaps, 247 military observers. 
20. Uni/ed Na/ions Angola Verifica/ion MissiolZ II (UNA VEM II), Angola, 
rune 1991-?, se Res. 696 of 30 May 1991. Maximum strength: 350 
military observers, 126 poliee monitors, 400 electoral observers (Septem-
ber 1992). Strength in March 1993: 75 military observers, 30 poliee 
monitors. 
21. Uni/ed Nations Observer Mission in Et Salvador (ONUSALi, EI Sal-
vador, ruly 1991-?, se Res. 693 af 20 May 1991 and se Res. 729 
165 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
of 14 January 1992. Authorized strength: 1000 military and poliee, 
146 intemational civilian staff (mainly human rigths observers). Strength 
in Mareh 1993: 286 civilan/poliee monitors, 94 military observers, 
7 troops. 
22. Uni/ed Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) , Westem Sahara, September 1991-?, SC Res. 658 of 27 
June 1990. Authorized strength: 1695 military observers and troops, 
300 poliee, and up to 1000 eivilians. Strength in Mareh 1913: 224 
milit3l')' observers, lia trops. 
23. United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAM/C), Cambodia, 
Oetober 1991-Mareh 1992, SC Res. 717 of 16 Oetober 1991. Strength: 
380. Absorbed by UNTAC. 
24. Uni/ed Na/ions Protection Force (UNPROFOR) , Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Croatia, Federal Republie of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
the former Yugoslav Republie or Maeedonia. Mareh 1992-?, SC Res. 
743 of 21 February 1992, SC Res. 761 of 29 June 1992. SC Res. 776 
of 14 September 1992, SC Res. 795 of 11 Deeember 1992, SC Res. 836 
af 4 June 1993. Authorized strength: oveI' 20000. Strength in March 
1993: 22534 troops, 394 military observers, 621 civilians/poliee. 
25. Uni/ed Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Cambodia. 
Mareh 1992-Deeember 1993, SC Res. 745 of 28 February 1992. Repla-
eed and absorbed the United Nations Advanee Mission in Cambodia 
(UNAMIC). Authorize strength: up to 20000 (miJitary; civilian poliee; 
eleetoral; civil administration; human rigths; repatriation; rehabilita-
tion). Strength in Mareh 1993; 3578 eivilians/poJiee, 15023 troops. 
488 military observers. 
26. Uni/ed Nations Operation in Somalia (UNO SOM 1), Somalia, April 
1992-April 1993, SC Res. 751 of 24 April and SC Res. 775 of 28 August 
1992. Strength in March 1993: 893 troops. Absorbed by UNOSOM II. 
27. Uni/ed Na/ions Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) , Mozambique, 
Oecember 1992-?, SC Res. 797 of 16 December 1992. Authorized 
strength; 7000-8000. Strength in .March 1993: 1082 troops, 153 observers. 
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28. Uni/ed Na/ions Operatiol7 in Soma/ia II (UNOSOM II), May 1993-"', 
se Res. 814 of 26 Mareh 1993: Authorized strength: aprox. 30000. 
29. Uni/ed Na/ions Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), Uganda-
-Rwanda border, August 1993-?, se Res. 846 of 22 June 1993. Autho-
rized strength: 81 military observers. 
30. Uni/ed Na/ions Observer Mission il1 Georgia (UNOM/G), Georgia, se 
Res. 858 of 24 August 1993. Authorized strength: 88 military observers. 
31. Uni/ed Na/ions Missions in Liberia (UNOMIL), Liberia, se Res. 866 
of 22 September 1993. Authorized strength:303 military observers, 
20 miJitary medical personnel, 45 military engineers, 129 international 
and local staff. 
32. United Na/ions Mission in Haiti (UNMIH!, Haiti, se Res. 867 of 23 
September 1993. The force was to eomprise: 567 UN poliee monitors 
and a military construction unit with a strength of aproximately 700. 
33. Uni/ed Nations Assistallee Mission for Rwanda (UNAM/R), Rwanda, 
se Res. 872 of 5 Oetober 1993. Strength by staged deployment, envisa-
ged as eonsisting at its height of 2548 personnel. 
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